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Abstract   This chapter examines my experience of late hearing impaired – 
becoming hearing impaired, being diagnosed as such and then living with this new 
impairment. The analysis considers this experience of impairment from the point of 
view of subjective and objective disability. I argue that I am currently less impaired 
now that I have been diagnosed as being hearing impaired than I was when I was 
not considered to be hearing impaired.  The chapter concludes that impairment is 
subjective, and should be considered so. It also concludes that context and age of 
impairment should be considered when understanding disability. 
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Introduction  
Are legal definitions of perceptual impairments always 
effective? Are the words deaf and blind merely descriptions, 
individual identities or are they practical problems that need to be 
overcome? Many people I have interviewed who became sensory 
impaired later in life, particularly people who lost their perceptions in 
old age, often find it difficult to adjust to an impaired identity 
(Hayhoe, 2008, 2013a, 2014). These people mix more with sighted 
and hearing people. They maintain their old habits. They 
communicate and understand the world through their previous 
identity.  Many of these people also express confusion about why they 
are seen in a similar way to other people with different forms of 
disability. These others’ experiences of life have little relevance to 
their own.  
 
 General models of a disability have been forthcoming (see for 
example, Pfeiffer, 2002). Yet there are few that accurately 
epistemologically and ontologically define disability as it relates to 
individuals from all walks of life. There are even fewer that define 
how we can identify and classify disabled people who acquire their 
impairments later in life. There is also little attempt to measure aspects 
of its antonym “ability” as a universal concept (Hayhoe, 2012). 
Hence, such issues remain entirely subjective in the context of method 
and study. 
  
 Perhaps a reason for holding with an idea of a whole sensory 
disabled identity is the need for institutional convenience. It is also 
the inability of science, social science and philosophy to overcome 
reductionist aspects of the mind-body problem in our understanding 
of the world (Nagel, 2012).  Importantly, beyond social scientific 
models and definitions, government organizations have had to 
introduce workable, holistic definitions of disability. This allows them 
to perform operations such as the distribution of funds and practical 
support. It also allows them to provide a workable explanation that 
can be used as the basis of legislation (Tibble, 2004). Similarly, over 
the past 35 years, the World Health Organisation has attempted to 
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define a holistic intra-cultural notion of disability in relation to the 
terms such as “normalisation”, “impairment” and “handicap” (World 
Health Organisation, 1980, 2014; Barbotte, Guillemin & Chau, 2001). 
However, these brief definitions appear less clear than the academic 
models they were informed by. Criticism of cultural norms and the 
difficulty of imposing a social identity on another person make such 
terms especially meaningless at best and dangerous and undemocratic 
at worst. This was illustrated clearly in my research on blindness and 
computer programming. During this study, I observed that blind 
programmers who became impaired later in life had a conception of 
programming that mirrored their previous sighted life. By contrast, 
those who had been born blind had a conception of technology 
according to their experiences in schools for the blind or inclusive 
mainstream education (Hayhoe, 2011).  
 
 So how can we best understand what it is to be sensory 
impaired in the context of social scientific and philosophical study? 
Furthermore, how can such concepts ever be defined in a capacity that 
gives meaning to disparate cultures with different ideals of social and 
cultural identity? This chapter explores these questions through an 
analysis of the social identity of disability, impairment and thus an 
implied definition of ability. It also examines the broader social-
philosophical notions of subjective and objective cultural identity. 
This chapter begins this task with an exemplar problem of my own 
late deafness and the anomalies that this has caused, in order to 
illustrate this problem. This essay is conducted using an auto-
ethnographic approach, with my own experiences being examined 
qualitatively (Ellis, Adams & Bochner, 2011). My reason for using 
this methodology was that I felt it reflected my own experiences of 
the process of my ambiguous cultural identity. In addition, it lessened 
any ethical issues of constructing a case study of experiences of 
impairment. 
 
A problem of late deafness 
 I can define my problem thus: I am 45 years old. Tinnitus runs 
in my mother’s family. My mother has it; my uncle had it; my 
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grandmother had it for as long as I can remember. When I was in my 
mid-twenties, I began to notice my hearing deteriorating. Because this 
problem was in my family, doctors monitored my progress. Early tests 
revealed that this problem wasn’t so great. I resisted further hearing 
tests until my mid-thirties, when it became too much of a problem to 
ignore. At this point, I had a further hearing test and discovered I had 
lost enough high frequencies to be classified hearing impaired. I now 
have to wear an ugly National Health Service hearing aid, until I earn 
enough to afford a high tech Danish hearing aid that can sit in my ear 
(virtually) invisibly.   
 
 So, am I disabled by my perceptual impairment? I would 
argue, not. There could have been a case for me being slightly 
disabled between my mid-twenties and the time the hearing therapist 
put a harsh plastic earpiece in my ear and asked me whether it was 
comfortable or not. After that moment my problem was more 
manageable. Despite the pain, his was the clearest voice I had heard 
for ages. Then when he plugged the chord into his computer to adjust 
its settings and rang a small bell, it felt unlike anything I had felt or 
heard for a long while – the sound was too loud and sharp. It was 
completely the opposite problem to the one I had had before. Before 
this time I had to rely solely on staring at my family, students and 
friends, hoping to see their voices as accurately as possible. 
  
 The initial answer to my problem then is that I have never felt 
disabled although I could have been said to be once. I grew up in a 
community where I was treated as an able-bodied person. I managed 
to handle what was felt to be my impairment in my own way, 
something to be controlled. In fact, I now overcompensate for it. Like 
some closet gay men who desperately bed women to preserve their 
manhood, I try to become super able, super normal. I wear Paul Smith 
jeans, Burberry socks, and dress for work with Austin Reed suits and 
Hawes & Curtis shirts; I buy Gucci sunglasses; I have taken degree 
upon degree; I have to think that my health, blood pressure, heart rate 
and waistline always have to be in good form; I write, draw and 
photograph as if my life depends on it. I am trying to move away from 
the life and the disability that I have seen in others. It was something 
they fought and hated, and it is something I feel I do not want to be a 
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part of now. So who does feel disabled by sensory impairment, and 
how do we take account of whether a person wants to define himself 
or herself as disabled or, to use a word that is often defined alongside 
it, impaired (Cameron Rochdale, Chadwick, Howie-Finn, Roelofs, 
1996)? 
 
 In order to build a workable definition of what sensory 
impairment and any subsequent disability2 “is”, it is arguable that 
disability should be regarded as a description of how a person is 
excluded from behaving in a comfortable or normal fashion by their 
society. However, this understanding of the normal has been found to 
be dependent on the two dimensions of the historical era and the social 
and cultural environment in which a disabled person resides (Hayhoe, 
2000, in press, 2008, 2012). In addition, disability can be visible or 
invisible, and it can also depend on individuals’ circumstances, such 
as their social class or occupation (Hayhoe, 2010, in press). Medically, 
disability is not an illness. It most often is, however, the outcome of 
an illness. Practically, it can be regarded as an injury to the functioning 
of culturally defined tasks (Crow, 1996). In this chapter, it is this last 
aspect of this definition that is of particular importance, and in the 
discussion that now follows this concept shall be broken into two 
further sub-concepts: subjective and objective aspects of disability. 
 
Subjective and objective aspects of disability 
 In order to simplify the “definition problem” of disability, it is 
necessary to see these conceptualisations in the context of social and 
cultural phenomenology. Firstly, the individual can define disability 
given particular circumstances: what an individual can do in those 
circumstances. In this chapter I refer to this as Subjective Disability. 
It is so called, because it examines each person’s trait according to its 
context and subject: the environment, the task, the man, the woman, 
                                                 
2 For brevity in this essay I refer to disability alone in many 
circumstances where disability and impairment are seen as being a 
similar social concept. 
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the girl or the boy, not the disabled identity of the person. For instance, 
I have no hearing impairment whilst I am reading a book, but I have 
a walking impairment when I am carrying heavy shopping bags. Thus, 
my identification as a hearing impaired person by others is based on 
many different concepts to those of a perception of my lived reality in 
many situations; i.e. although my hearing problem only takes up a 
little of my life and its degree of annoyance or disability is dependent 
on individual circumstances, this is felt to control enough of my 
normal existence to constitute disadvantage, suffering or discomfort. 
In a social context, however, this conception of disability is related to 
the social and cultural consequences of its medical causes, such as 
whether a person can still make money or participate in the broader 
economy (Oliver, 2013), whether they can present themselves in a 
way that is felt to be acceptable by their society or whether they can 
perform other social tasks as expected by their society (Goffman, 
1990). For instance, subjectively a person is never blind or an amputee 
never crippled when they are on the telephone, they are only felt to be 
disabled when they are presented with visual information or asked to 
walk or lift objects. 
 
 Secondly, disability can be seen as what a society tells a person 
they can or cannot do in particular circumstances. In this chapter I call 
this concept Objective Disability.  It is so called because it classifies 
a group of people with similar traits as an object, a group or a sub-
culture (Oliver, 2013; Hayhoe, 2012). It is then thought of as an 
identity, and symbols such as hearing aids, white canes and walking 
sticks – implements which are designed to help its common subjective 
traits, such as the amplification of sound, the information gained from 
the vibrations of a cane or the control of balance when walking - tell 
the greater society that the person possessing the symbol has a 
disability – hence the white of the white cane or the brown plastic of 
many modern functionalist hearing aids from the British NHS, which 
is for the purpose of the viewer and not the deaf or blind user. 
Similarly, social scientific modes of examining the constrictions and 
classifications of these deviant traits which are thought to be inherent 
in disability are discussed and framed by authors such as Michel 
Foucault (1989) and Erving Goffman (1990, 1991) in terms of 
deviance, disadvantage or social labelling; although their mode of 
When Gucci Makes Hearing Aids, I’ll Be Deaf  
 
describing these concepts and their conclusions differ radically 
according to their separate political conceptualisation. Foucault in 
particular takes a radical neo-Marxist approach to explaining this 
problem (Steinmetz, 1994), whereas Goffman proffers a more liberal 
and contextual symbolic interactionist interpretation (Goffman & 
Best, 2005) in which the individual is seen in the almost theatrical 
setting of his or her greater society.   
 
 In terms of the cognitive sciences, the paradoxes and problems 
of crossing from one identity to another is particularly apparent in the 
sudden change from a disabled identity to a non-disabled identity 
(Berkeley, 1899; Gregory, 1974; Sacks, 1993) or able bodied to 
disabled (Hull, 1990). The most extreme phenomenon associated with 
this latter change of identity is illustrated by Merleau-Ponty (2002) in 
his description of the phantom limb. In this instance, patients who 
have had a limb amputated still consciously believe it is still present, 
and in this way the new objectively disabled human has a 
subconscious denial of his or her new condition. 
 
 Thus there are many conditions that need to be fulfilled for a 
man to be considered Objectively Disabled (Hayhoe 2004, in press).  
For instance, if a person has injured legs he or she will be considered 
objectively disabled. He or she will not be able to walk to his or her 
local shops without severe discomfort. He or she can use a wheelchair. 
However, this would also make him or her less agile or fast on most 
pavements / sidewalks than people walking normally. Whilst walking 
or in his or her wheelchair he or she will look very different and travel 
more slowly. His or her wheelchair is also associated with others with 
crippled legs. The man or woman cannot do anything to change his or 
her crippled legs, even with strengthening exercises. His or her legs 
will not heal themselves. His or her condition is also rare and extreme 
enough to be different from a great number of people in society. 
 
 In terms of a more esoteric example, considered to be on the 
edge of social reasoning since the Enlightenment (Hopkins, 2005), we 
can define blindness as referring to a range of symptoms that affect 
the optical information required to fulfil many socially visual 
culturally tasks - it must again be made clear at this point that 
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blindness itself is not a disease, it is the outcome of a disease, a trait 
it leaves behind. It can also have a range of forms and blindness can 
cause Subjective Disability, although in its social context it can also 
be considered an Objective Disability. For instance, for individuals to 
draw a realistic picture it is assumed that they require some degree of 
visual acuity. They must picture their subject as a whole. They must 
know that they are drawing correctly shaped and shaded areas on 
paper. An individual must have feedback from the lines that he or she 
has drawn. This allows a person to know where to put further lines. 
However, these difficulties can be overcome to a large extent, 
allowing an artist with no sight to touch. Persons can also be educated 
about what they are touching, and they can be taught to use tactile 
media such as German film, which rises as soon as it is scribed with 
a pen (Hayhoe, 2008). Blindness in this case is not such a grave 
Subjective Disability. 
 
 Thus, to be considered blind in terms of a visual arts culture, 
an Objective Disability, a man or woman must not be able to perform 
what society deems to be most normal tasks without great assistance. 
For instance, even though blind people can read Braille or large print 
with residual vision, their relative speed of reading is severely 
restricted and thus more time should be given to allow for this in 
controlled situations (Warren, 1994). The extra technology needed 
also requires more storage space. This is less efficiently produced 
(Hayhoe, 2013b). Blind people often have eyes that look different to 
people who are considered to be sighted. They wear glasses and carry 
white canes. If they are congenitally or early blind, they also often 
move their heads when talking. Blind or deaf people often have little 
chance of reversing their impairments in the short term. If their 
condition is operable, it usually takes a while for healing to take place. 
Their sight, hearing and bodies must also adjust or readjust. Some 
permanent conditions that cause impairments, such as cataracts, 
glaucoma, or tinnitus can be reversed or at least controlled as a result 
of diet, exercise, relaxation techniques or therapy. This takes a long 
time, however. 
 
 Furthermore, small sensory impairments that require regular 
prescription glasses for correction are frequent. This is because these 
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are relatively common implements that do not symbolise rare physical 
or psychological conditions or impairments and can be used by many 
members of the public temporarily or impermanently – this is 
particularly true of walking sticks and clear glasses as the strength of 
the impairment is not denoted by the objects themselves; for example, 
the difference between glasses for permanent, serious sight problems 
and weak reading glasses is not apparent until they are examined 
closely and the difference between the lenses becomes apparent. Yet 
conditions that do not necessarily lead to normal dysfunctioning of 
the body apart from the limited ability to move, see or hear at a 
particular speed and in certain lighting or environmental conditions, 
such as amputation, paraplegia, multiple sclerosis, photophobia, 
achromatism and tinnitus, are rarer and thus regarded as disabilities. 
There are also cultural anomalies in this scientific process, and these 
are now discussed below. 
Cultural anomalies and disability 
 Most cultures have formalised their rules of defining 
disabilities such as blindness or deafness as objective disabilities. 
Legislation in many western countries in particular has taken this a 
stage further. Such countries legally classify the level at which this 
weakness of optical functioning disables most social tasks. In the 
British Isles, for instance, legal blindness is measured at 5% sight or 
1/20 visual acuity or less, and has been for many years (Coakes & 
Holmes Sellors, 1992). This reductionist definition is too simplistic, 
however. For example, in the case of traits such as achromatism, 
visual acuity can increase through lack of normal light perception 
(Sacks, 2001; Hayhoe, 2008). The testing of this visual acuity must 
therefore take place in what are considered to be normal lighting 
conditions. As a consequence, the whole of the person is not judged 
according to a rigid scientific test at a particular point in time, under 
culturally defined conditions. 
 
 Aside from people who have no light or sound recognition 
whatsoever, each person’s visual impairment is perceptually unique. 
Scientifically, however, the range of symptoms can be classified as: 
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blurred vision, tunnel vision (where peripheral vision is missing), 
peripheral vision only, tinnitus, spots in vision, achromatism (lack of 
certain or all colours), loss of low frequencies, loss or high 
frequencies, or a combination of all these symptoms. It is also very 
rare for someone to be totally blind or deaf. It is much more common 
for them to have a small amount of light or sound perception. 
However, in many circumstances policies are often targeted at the 
rarest rather than the most common strengths of impairment (Hayhoe, 
2013c). Therefore, psychologically and sociologically, blindness and 
deafness can be classified in three further ways - I acknowledge help 
from Lowenfeld’s (1981) psychological definition of blindness for 
this classification: 
 
1. Congenital blindness: When a man or woman is born blind. The 
consequence of congenital blindness is that a person will have no 
visual memory or his or her visual memory will be based solely on 
his or her highly restricted light perception.  
2. Early blindness: When a man or woman has gone blind in 
childhood. Men who are early blind often have visual memories 
and can often understand visual reference. 
3. Late blindness: When a man or woman goes blind in adulthood. For 
example, at the turn of the millennium around 70% of all blind 
people in England and Wales were over 75 (Department of Health, 
2001). This number is still increasing as the older population 
increases. Much of this population’s perceptual reference is still 
related to vision. 
 
Thus we find that all of these attempts to classify even a subset of 
disability can hold no single, measurable or firm answer, or workable 
definition in the context of academic scientific study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 When attempting to understand the concept of disability in 
relation to sensory impairment the background of these issues and, 
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moreover, the background of the people thus classified are often not 
taken into account in many academic or institutional discourses on 
disability. In truth, some people who are objectively classified as 
impaired or disabled later in life will still want to be associated with 
an able bodied culture; and if they are disabled later in life, they will 
want to relate their identities with their previous experiences and 
cultural and social groups. Indeed, these people, as Merleau-Ponty 
found, even subconsciously will want to feel they are that same person 
they used to be.  Therefore the experience that they are now legally 
entitled to is largely an adapted version of their able bodied 
experiences. Hence, the language used to describe such people is 
more often than not the same as an able bodied person. The social and 
cultural references are those you would give to any other person 
because, in their mind, there is no difference. 
 
 The person who has a sensory impairment from a very young 
age, though, can often be said to have a different culture. They often 
want to feel that they are of the class, gender, ethnicity, or religion 
they were born into, but the cultural medium they have to refer to this 
culture will be different, as a result of their institutional experiences. 
This means that certain technologies and objects, such as walking 
sticks, canes, dark glasses or hearing aids, which are associated with 
disability, may have a greater symbolic meaning to the person with 
the impairment than the person without it. To use the metaphor of art, 
for instance, I like the works of Klimt, Bacon, Freud, Gilbert & 
George, Mozart, Puccini, and Debussy. However, do their pieces 
mean the same to a person who has never seen or heard their works 
of art as I have? Or do these art works mean nothing to anyone who 
has never heard of these artists? 
 
 It does not matter whether we see or hear, touch or smell as 
everyone else does, we can still engage culturally and emotionally in 
any subject matter uniquely according to our personal histories. These 
emotions come from different life experiences. Therefore, the 
different experiences of educational, medical, governmental, or 
cultural institutionalisation, and the exclusion that is derived from this 
institutionalisation, in relation to the congenitally and early disabled 
person must be considered when communicating or developing 
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policies and support for them, just as the need to feel as a person did 
when they were more able bodied should be to the person who 
develops a later sensory impairment. Moreover, in this process 
perhaps the phrase unique context should be emphasised. When Gucci 
makes a National Health Service hearing aid or white cane, just as 
they make fashionable glasses, many more people will be happy to 
call themselves deaf. But until institutions and the greater society they 
say that they represent accept that such people want to be considered 
equal in the culture they were raised in, yet preserve a unique sense 
of identity and self-expression, they will often continue to keep their 
deafness or blindness as close to the closet as their physically and 
socially painful hearing aids and white canes will allow them to. 
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